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	<title>Comments on: Let 10,000 Flowers Bloom</title>
	<link>http://www.blindside.org.uk/2007/09/26/let-10000-flowers-bloom/</link>
	<description>What's going to go wrong in our e-enabled world?</description>
	<pubDate>Thu, 20 Nov 2008 11:44:16 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>By: Dave Walker</title>
		<link>http://www.blindside.org.uk/2007/09/26/let-10000-flowers-bloom/#comment-2835</link>
		<dc:creator>Dave Walker</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Sep 2007 13:57:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://www.blindside.org.uk/2007/09/26/let-10000-flowers-bloom/#comment-2835</guid>
		<description>Now, if they were 10,000 Sun Rays (http://www.sun.com/software/index.jsp?cat=Desktop&#38;tab=3&#38;subcat=Sun%20Ray%20Clients ) in a laptop form factor with a 3G interface (see the DT 1202 under "Thin Clients" at http://www.digital-touch.eu/ , which could also be ruggedised and have a suitable encryptor built in), you'd knock quite a few of those risks, off the list. I'd expect that most accreditors would have a conniption about mobile devices (even stateess ones) being allowed to access anything higher than RESTRICTED.

I agree with the above commenter on the risks associated with duress situations, though; see http://blogs.sun.com/davew/entry/on_duress .</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Now, if they were 10,000 Sun Rays (http://www.sun.com/software/index.jsp?cat=Desktop&amp;tab=3&amp;subcat=Sun%20Ray%20Clients ) in a laptop form factor with a 3G interface (see the DT 1202 under &#8220;Thin Clients&#8221; at <a href="http://www.digital-touch.eu/" rel="nofollow">http://www.digital-touch.eu/</a> , which could also be ruggedised and have a suitable encryptor built in), you&#8217;d knock quite a few of those risks, off the list. I&#8217;d expect that most accreditors would have a conniption about mobile devices (even stateess ones) being allowed to access anything higher than RESTRICTED.</p>
<p>I agree with the above commenter on the risks associated with duress situations, though; see <a href="http://blogs.sun.com/davew/entry/on_duress" rel="nofollow">http://blogs.sun.com/davew/entry/on_duress</a> .</p>
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		<title>By: Watching Them, Watching Us</title>
		<link>http://www.blindside.org.uk/2007/09/26/let-10000-flowers-bloom/#comment-2821</link>
		<dc:creator>Watching Them, Watching Us</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 26 Sep 2007 13:15:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://www.blindside.org.uk/2007/09/26/let-10000-flowers-bloom/#comment-2821</guid>
		<description>So are these"handheld computers" linked online by radio to the central Police systems, or are they just offline data entry boxes ?

Would you really want to be a Confidential Human Informant who has tipped off the authorities in relation to Serious Organised Crime, terrorism or even ASBO deserving neighbours etc. once these handheld devices start getting lost or stolen ? 

How is it possible to let these thousands of devices connect to Confidential or Secret intelligence databases, when they are not in a physically secure environment like a proper Police station, but in an unsecured and potentially hostile environment out on patrol ? 

How long before Police officers or perhaps PCSOs are kidnapped and tortured or threatened with violence to allow serious criminals or terrorists to access such systems via these mobile handheld devices ? If these mobile devices do not have access to such systems, then what use are they in real crime fighting rather than, say, just for booking overtime and claiming travel expenses  ?

What about the likely man-in-the-middle attacks which will capture and replay genuine credentials (no matter how well encrypted) from such remote radio devices ? 

Have you ever tried using a handheld computer, of any sort, at night, in the rain or snow, with gloves on, like many Police officers on patrol have to endure  ?

A military spec ruggedised handheld computer cannot possibly be as lightweight and small as say an Apple iPhone or other civilian consumer PDA device. 

Which bits of allegedly "mobile" equipment will the Police officers choose to drop in a hurry, when they are trying to chase  a running suspect ? Stab resistant body armour, handcuffs, baton, pepper spray,  Airwave encrypted radio, spare batteries for power hungry Airwave radio, GPRS  mobile phone, or the new "handheld computer" ? What about all the other new "mobile" devices that are be trialled and which they might be expected to carry soon, like tasers, mobile fingerprint scanners, personal video cameras and recording equipment (and batteries) or the "handheld weapons detectors" mentioned elsewhere in the speech etc ?

Police forces have been "evaluating" and "piloting" all sorts of mobile computers, both handheld and vehicle mounted, for many years. Why have none of these previous projects been successful enough for an entire Police force to be equipped with them, to the exclusion of the other paper and desktop systems ?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>So are these&#8221;handheld computers&#8221; linked online by radio to the central Police systems, or are they just offline data entry boxes ?</p>
<p>Would you really want to be a Confidential Human Informant who has tipped off the authorities in relation to Serious Organised Crime, terrorism or even ASBO deserving neighbours etc. once these handheld devices start getting lost or stolen ? </p>
<p>How is it possible to let these thousands of devices connect to Confidential or Secret intelligence databases, when they are not in a physically secure environment like a proper Police station, but in an unsecured and potentially hostile environment out on patrol ? </p>
<p>How long before Police officers or perhaps PCSOs are kidnapped and tortured or threatened with violence to allow serious criminals or terrorists to access such systems via these mobile handheld devices ? If these mobile devices do not have access to such systems, then what use are they in real crime fighting rather than, say, just for booking overtime and claiming travel expenses  ?</p>
<p>What about the likely man-in-the-middle attacks which will capture and replay genuine credentials (no matter how well encrypted) from such remote radio devices ? </p>
<p>Have you ever tried using a handheld computer, of any sort, at night, in the rain or snow, with gloves on, like many Police officers on patrol have to endure  ?</p>
<p>A military spec ruggedised handheld computer cannot possibly be as lightweight and small as say an Apple iPhone or other civilian consumer PDA device. </p>
<p>Which bits of allegedly &#8220;mobile&#8221; equipment will the Police officers choose to drop in a hurry, when they are trying to chase  a running suspect ? Stab resistant body armour, handcuffs, baton, pepper spray,  Airwave encrypted radio, spare batteries for power hungry Airwave radio, GPRS  mobile phone, or the new &#8220;handheld computer&#8221; ? What about all the other new &#8220;mobile&#8221; devices that are be trialled and which they might be expected to carry soon, like tasers, mobile fingerprint scanners, personal video cameras and recording equipment (and batteries) or the &#8220;handheld weapons detectors&#8221; mentioned elsewhere in the speech etc ?</p>
<p>Police forces have been &#8220;evaluating&#8221; and &#8220;piloting&#8221; all sorts of mobile computers, both handheld and vehicle mounted, for many years. Why have none of these previous projects been successful enough for an entire Police force to be equipped with them, to the exclusion of the other paper and desktop systems ?</p>
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